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How can differences in per capita household electricity consumption across African countries be un-
derstood? Based on theories that highlight the importance of democracy and institutional quality for
provision of public goods, the aim of the paper is to analyse the degree to which the level of per capita
household electricity consumption in African countries can be attributed to the countries’ democratic
status and their institutional quality. We rely on regression analysis employing a pooled data set for 44
African countries over the time period 1996–2009. The analysis shows that democracy and institutional
quality both have signiﬁcant positive effects on per capita household consumption of electricity. Our
results have implications for how energy sector reforms are promoted in developing countries. At a more
general level they illustrate that institution-building policy efforts are relevant also in areas where
contemporary debates have tended to primarily centre on economic development, ﬁnancial prerequisites
and ownership issues.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Background and motivation
In this paper we address the question of why African countries
differ in terms of households’ ability to beneﬁt from electricity
services. Electricity is a unique energy carrier that is purposefully
applied in almost all aspects of daily life among the richest seg-
ment of the world's population. It is essential for modern com-
munications, industrial development and the build-up of public
services such as streetlights, improved education and health care.
Existing and future applications of electricity and other modernLtd. This is an open access article u
hlborg).energy carriers will be instrumental to achieving many of the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in September
2015 by the member states of the United Nations. Whereas the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) did not explicitly address
the energy situation and its relation to poverty alleviation, Goal
7 among the SDGs is to “ensure access to affordable, reliable,
sustainable and modern energy for all” (United Nations, 2015). The
related targets promote enhanced international cooperation to
facilitate energy access, and express the need to expand infra-
structure and upgrade technology, especially in the least devel-
oped countries. Also, a recent report from ‘Sustainable Energy for
All’ (SE4All) emphasizes the importance of understanding the in-
teractions between energy and other development areas, such as
food, water, gender equality, education and health, in order to
achieve the objectives of the SDGs and the SE4All programme (WB
and IEA, 2015).nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1 ODA is a widely used indicator of international aid ﬂow, coined by the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
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exceeds supply (Eberhard et al., 2011). The continent is rich in
unexploited energy resources, and increasing the generation and
availability of electricity is a political priority in most countries. In
the public debate, electricity is often portrayed as part of ‘mod-
ernity’ – the aspirations towards improved socioeconomic stan-
dards of living and political-economic equality (e.g., Ferguson,
2006; Winther, 2008). Evidence shows that in areas where access
to electricity has been provided, there have been substantial so-
cietal beneﬁts of long-term importance for social and economic
development, including lightning, education, health, leisure and
security (e.g., Davis, 1998; Karekezi and Majoro, 2002; Kirubi et al.,
2009; Spalding-Fecher, 2005).
However, in spite of the above, especially sub-Saharan Africa is
lagging behind the rest of the world in regard to electricity pro-
vision and use in the household sector. The countries in this region
suffer both economically and socially from underdevelopment of
the electric power sector, including insufﬁcient generation capa-
city, unreliability of existing power supplies, poor transmission
and distribution infrastructure and very low rates of access to the
electricity grid (Eberhard et al., 2011; WB and IEA, 2015). In 2012,
the access rate in sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at 35 per cent.
During the period 2010–2012, the access expansion in this region
only kept pace with population growth, and expansion mainly
took place in urban areas whereas access rates actually fell in rural
areas (WB and IEA, 2015). Thus, even if the African continent is
rich in energy sources, technical solutions exist and increased
electricity provision is much desired, this has not been enough to
result in a clear increase in electricity access and higher con-
sumption levels in the majority of African countries. There is a
large literature that addresses the multitude of reasons – histor-
ical, ﬁnancial, political, social and technical – behind the energy
situation in various African countries (e.g., Eberhard et al., 2011;
Khennas, 2012; Sokona et al., 2012). Institutional aspects have
received signiﬁcant attention both in terms of country-speciﬁc and
regional institutional drivers and barriers to increased electricity
access. The importance of “effective, accountable and inclusive
institutions at all levels” is also emphasized in the SDGs Goal 16 on
peaceful and inclusive societies (United Nations, 2015). We intend
to complement the existing literature discussing institutional as-
pects (e.g. Foley, 1992; Haanyika, 2006; Karekezi and Kimani,
2002; WB, 2009) by approaching electriﬁcation in African coun-
tries as a case of public goods provision.
This implies that the beneﬁts of providing access to affordable
electricity via national grids are non-excludable and “non-riv-
alrous” (e.g., street lights, reliability, etc.) indicating a limited in-
centive for individuals or the private sector to contribute to their
production (e.g., Abbott, 2001). The building of large-scale trans-
mission and distribution infrastructure is hugely expensive and a
long-term investment, thus typically of little interest to commer-
cial investors. Rural electriﬁcation is particularly expensive in
places with difﬁcult terrain, dispersed settlement and/or low po-
pulation density. For these reasons, national electric utilities have
historically been reluctant to extend the electricity services to
rural areas. Affordable rural electriﬁcation has in most countries
been achieved through special national programmes and funding
arrangements, including the use of subsidies (Zomers, 2003).
Hence, the undertaking of electrifying the entire population is
primarily politically driven, posing high demands on both the
political and the administrative system.
Previous research suggests that democracy and institutional
quality are key prerequisites for the active support of and the
provision of public goods (McGuire and Olson, 1996; Deacon,
2003; Lake and Baum, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix
et al., 2003; Rothstein, 2011; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008;
Schmitter and Karl, 1991). In this article, we are interested ininvestigating if this notion also applies to the case of electricity
provision to households in Africa.
1.2. Objectives and scope
Even if electricity is provided in one sense, i.e., through the
extension of the national grid, one also needs to assess whether
the electricity actually becomes a “good” for the public in the sense
that households can beneﬁt from it. Therefore we go beyond
previously studied issues, such as provision of infrastructure (as
when measuring access to the grid), and even more closely, yet
distant matters, such as residential share of electricity relative to
industry (Brown and Mobarak, 2009). We do this by trying to
capture realized use of electricity.
Thereby, our aim is to provide a statistical investigation of the
determinants of per capita household electricity consumption in
African countries with a particular emphasis on the impacts of
democratic government and high quality institutions (e.g., rule of
law and control of corruption). As will be discussed in more detail
below, studying per capita household electricity consumption has
several advantages over alternative indicators of provision of
electricity to households, including access rates (see Section 2.2).
This article contributes to a growing literature on electriﬁcation
in developing countries (e.g., Min, 2008; Nanka-Bruce, 2010;
Onyeji et al., 2012). This research has pointed to a number of
drivers and barriers to electriﬁcation, including oil production,
economic development, population density, as well as the risk of
conﬂict and violence. These variables are therefore also included
as controls in our regression analysis. While previous quantitative
studies often have had to rely on cross-sectional data, the present
analysis builds on data from 44 African countries over the time
period 1996–2009.
1.3. Household electriﬁcation and electricity consumption in Africa
According to Eberhard et al. (2011:53), “(i)nstalled capacity will
need to grow by more than 10 per cent annually (…) just to meet
Africa's suppressed demand, keep pace with projected economic
growth, and provide additional capacity to support efforts to ex-
pand electriﬁcation.” There are often barriers related to building
and operating the infrastructure needed in both urban and rural
areas, as well as barriers to electriﬁcation resulting in socio-eco-
nomic development (for a review of these, see Ahlborg, 2012).
Many African governments are constrained by the substantial
costs involved in building large-scale electricity infrastructure and
contributions from ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA)1 to
public investment in the electric power sector have been far below
the levels needed to keep pace with economic growth and/or in
order to expand public access (World Bank, 2009).
Access rates reﬂect the degree to which the government makes
electricity infrastructure accessible to the public, but data on
connection rates need to be complemented with aspects such as
capacity, affordability, reliability, quality and safety (WB and IEA,
2015: 30). In 2008, the entire generation capacity of sub-Saharan
countries amounted to 68 gigawatts (GW), which is no more than
that of Spain, and 60 per cent out of this was installed in South
Africa alone. Annual electricity generation is in turn comparatively
low for a number of reasons, including aging plants, lack of
maintenance, and seasonal lack of water in dams. Many countries
are also dependent on imported oil and diesel, a situation that
creates a vulnerability to high oil prices in the world market
(World Bank, 2009).
Fig. 1. Per capita household electricity consumption in African Countries, 1990 and
2009. Source: United Nations (2013).
Fig. 2. Per capita household electricity consumption (kWh): Selection of ten Afri-
can countries failing to provide increased household electricity access. Source:
United Nations (2013).
Fig. 3. Per capita household electricity consumption (kWh): Selection of ten Afri-
can countries succeeding to provide increased household electricity access Source:
United Nations (2013).
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levels. In 2008 the average annual per capita consumption in sub-
Saharan Africa, South Africa excluded, was only 124 kWh (World
Bank, 2009).2 This estimate is, however, based on total electricity
consumption in all sectors of the economy. The consumption so-
lely by households is therefore considerably smaller. Fig. 1 displays
how a set of 44 African countries can be divided into six different
groups with respect to their annual per capita household elec-
tricity consumption levels, indicating also changes over the time
period 1990–2009.
In many of these countries, household electricity consumption
has been very low. Averaged over the whole populations – in-
cluding those with no access to electricity – consumption in many
cases has been lower than 50 kWh per capita. Although some
countries have experienced a shift towards higher levels of elec-
tricity consumption many have also remained stagnant with vir-
tually no growth (some even experiencing a decline over time).
Figs. 2 and 3 provide an illustration of this through a more
detailed account of per capita household electricity consumption
in Africa by scrutinizing a number of selected countries. Speciﬁ-
cally, Fig. 2 shows ten examples of countries in which the per
capita consumption levels have been maintained at very low levels
or even decreased during the period 1990–2009, while Fig. 3 in-
stead displays the development in ten African countries that have
managed to achieve a non-negligible increase in consumption. The
difference in the scale used to display per capita consumption
levels (y-axis) in these two ﬁgures is profound. Overall Figs. 2 and
3, although only focusing on a selection of countries, illustrate an
interesting variation across various African countries. This varia-
tion deserves further investigation.
In many African countries, electricity supply is notoriously
unreliable. Low electric power quality, exempliﬁed by blackouts
and power rationing in national grids, is a common problem that
incurs signiﬁcant costs associated with damages to equipment and
disruption of productive activities (World Bank, 2009). Aspects of
capacity and quality are critical for industrial development (VPC,
2008; World Bank, 2008) but also for the development of micro
and small-scale businesses, many of which are found among the
household segment of electricity customers (Haselip et al., 2015).
Thus, a statistical investigation of electricity provision as a case of
public good provision requires that the dependent variable mea-
sures the degree to which households not only access but actually
use electricity (which indirectly reﬂects the quality of supply since
consumption levels are lower when access is low and supply is
very unreliable).2 A slightly different estimate for 2008, i.e., 155 kWh per capita, is provided by
Bazilian et al. (2012).1.4. Outline of paper
The next section presents the methodological approach of the
analysis. We here address the main theoretical arguments by
discussing the relationship between democracy and institutional
quality on the one hand and public good provision on the other.
Two empirically testable hypotheses are derived. In this section
our data and analytical techniques are also presented. Section 3
then outlines and discusses the results from the statistical analysis,
while Section 4 discusses some important implications, not the
least for policy-making. Section 5 concludes the paper and points
towards some directions for future research.2. Methods: Theoretical framework and empirical approach
2.1. The relationship between democracy, good governance and
household electricity consumption
One of the central debates in research on the drivers behind
public goods provision concerns what kinds of governments –
democratic or autocratic – that provide public goods, such as basic
infrastructure and social services, most effectively. Clearly, demo-
cratic institutions – through which the leaders of a country are
held accountable to the citizens – create a strong incentive among
leaders to deliver, for example, generally demanded public goods
such as affordable electricity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006;
Schmitter and Karl, 1991). Since elections provide citizens with the
power to replace leaders that do not fulﬁl these expectations, and
since public good provision is likely to be included in the
3 It should also be noted that in our dependent variable will also account for
any off-grid access to electricity using solar PV or other generation options in those
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lead to more public good provision (McGuire and Olson, 1996;
Deacon, 2003; Lake and Baum, 2001). Moreover, generally de-
mocracy can be expected to work in the interest of the majority
(i.e., the rural population) since a larger portion of the citizenry is
included in the political process, whereas authoritarian regimes
will frequently only see to a narrow elite (Bueno de Mequita et al.,
2003; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006). Though primarily concerned
with how the share of electricity consumption differs between the
residential sector and the industry sector depending on regime
type, Brown and Mobarak (2009) nonetheless ﬁnd certain support
for this argument. At least among the poorest countries in their
data set (some of which are African), democratic governments
tend to increase the residential sector's share of electricity con-
sumption relative to industry's share, thus indicating a positive
relationship between democracy and provision of electricity to the
public. Following this line of literature, the ﬁrst hypothesis to be
tested is
H1. : The more democratic a country is, the higher is per capita
household electricity consumption.
Despite strong theoretical reasons to expect a positive effect of
democratic institutions on public goods provision, some scholars
argue that democratic institutions are alone no guarantee for
successful public good provision. The ﬁrst reason is that elected
leaders often work with short time horizons (Haggard, 1991;
Keefer, 2006) whereas public good provision – not least in the
form of investments in electric power infrastructure – is a long-
term undertaking (Min, 2008). Second, the discussion on the im-
portance of democracy has a certain Western bias. The focus on
accountability and incentive structures for political leaders tend to
overlook situations where political leaders wish to provide public
goods but are not able to do so. In African countries, democratic
accountability may still be crucial for political leaders’ relative
interest in providing public goods, but it might not be all that
relevant for their capacity to do so. This was highlighted by an
engineer working with rural electriﬁcation at the public utility in
Tanzania (quote from interview by ﬁrst author in 2010): “Political
pressures you know. Like now in October it's the elections, so all
the politicians are running like hell [laughing]. They want elec-
tricity, there is no money but they want the people to hear that
they are struggling and working.” This statement reﬂects that
especially in times of elections, politicians may try to fulﬁl pro-
mises to the electorate, even in cases when necessary ﬁnancial
resources are not available.
Third, several studies also show how corruption and cliente-
listic practices (i.e., the exchange of goods and services for political
support) can undermine governments’ performance also in cases
where democratic institutions are in place (Bratton and van de
Walle, 1994, 1997; Chandra, 2004; Min, 2008). The importance of
these types of factors should not be underestimated: “bad gov-
ernance” – characterized for example by corruption, patronage
and favouritism – has been described as a “spectre haunting de-
mocracy in the world today” (Diamond, 2007: 119).
Thus, the hypothesis on the importance of democracy must be
complemented with other perspectives. In this paper we focus on
the importance of institutional quality for public goods provision.
With “institutions” we here refer to “the rules of the game” (e.g.,
North, 1990), i.e., various external factors shaping and constraining
human behaviour and learning including both legal rules and in-
formal codes of conduct (March and Olsen, 1989; Peters, 1999).
Institutional characteristics that are expected to be important for
public service provision include everything from the quality of the
bureaucracy and the competence of civil servants, the extent to
which there is effective “rule of law” (where fair and predictablerules facilitate economic and social interactions), and the presence
or absence of corruption, conventionally deﬁned as the exercise of
public power for private gain (Gupta et al., 2000; Holmberg et al.,
2009; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Mauro, 1998; North, 1990; Nye,
1967).
On the one hand, institutions can have direct effects on public
good provision (Barzel, 2002). On the other hand they can also
have an indirect effect in that they inﬂuence the expectations that
people have on the implementing agencies. In other words,
trustworthy institutional systems, with a positive “history of play”
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) can be expected to positively in-
ﬂuence the ability of agencies to provide public goods, not least
through their impact on the ability to build consent regarding the
collection of taxes and other contributions.
In line with this argument, the literature on rural electriﬁcation
in developing countries has identiﬁed poor organizational struc-
tures and corruption as some of the barriers to successful elec-
triﬁcation (e.g., Ahlborg and Hammar, 2014; Jones and Thompson,
1996; Karekezi and Majoro, 2002). In addition, earlier studies have
shown that political interference in public electric utilities impacts
negatively on their performance (Karekezi and Kimani, 2002; Zo-
mers, 2003).
What these ﬁndings suggest is that not only are investments
needed in improved generation capacity and expansion of large-
scale grid infrastructure; investments in well-functioning and
adequate institutional frameworks and organizations seem to be
equally important prerequisites for effective electricity provision
at the household level. This is well in line with a growing literature
arguing that regardless of whether a country is democratic or not,
the output-side of the governance system is crucial (Boix et al.,
2003; Rothstein, 2011; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Thus, ac-
cording to, for instance Rothstein (2011), the presence of corrup-
tion and poor government effectiveness explains social perfor-
mance rates, and thus not the level of democracy.
Proceeding from the broad literature on the quality of institu-
tions, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
H2. : The higher institutional quality a country has, the higher is the
per capita household electricity consumption.
The strong focus on the potential roles of democracy and in-
stitutional quality on the electriﬁcation of African countries re-
presents our main contribution to the existing empirical literature.
Below we explain in more detail how these analytical concepts
have been operationalized in the quantitative analyses, along with
the other variables used.
2.2. Statistical analysis: variable deﬁnitions and sources
2.2.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable in our statistical analysis is annual
household electricity consumption per capita (kWh per capita/
year). Data over household electricity consumption come from the
Energy Statistics Database provided by the United Nations Statis-
tics Division Database (United Nations, 2013). Using a per capita
measure – rather than measuring average consumption among the
electriﬁed minority – has the advantage that we can compare
development patterns across countries of different population si-
zes. Moreover, we can also assess whether consumption levels
have kept pace with population growth, a good indication of
whether the government provides services of a certain quality,
reaches new parts of the population, and/or whether the popu-
lation with existing access increases its consumption over time.3
Table 1
Per capita household electricity consumption versus electricity access in 44 African
countries, year 2004.
Access to electricity per capita household
electricity use
0–25% 26–60% 61–100%
0–50 kWh 21 0 0
51–300 kWh 3 10 4
301 kWh or higher 0 1 5
Source: International Energy Agency (2004) and United Nations (2013).
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great interest to policy makers since such growth could indicate
that the middle class of these countries has gained access to
electricity of reasonable quality and price. The middle class can
afford appliances and other electricity-consuming activities, why a
growing middle class will result in notable increase in electricity
load. Poor households that become electriﬁed, on the other hand,
tend to stay at a minimum consumption level for many years also
when tariffs are low (Louw et al., 2008; van der Vleuten et al.,
2007). In this paper, though, we are not able to address the often
profound country heterogeneity (e.g., in terms of income disparity,
rural versus urban population shares etc.), which clearly is an
important issue for future research.
In order to explain the merits and limitations of our dependent
variable, we now discuss it in comparison with two alternative
measures that are used by other scholars as dependent variables in
statistical analyses. The ﬁrst one is the commonly used ‘elec-
triﬁcation rate’ or ‘access rate’ deﬁned as the share of population
with access to electricity from national grids (regardless of the
level of use). The International Energy Agency (IEA) provides data
on access rates. We expect access rates and household consump-
tion levels to be indirectly related. Notably, our use of a per capita
measure is connected to access rates in the sense that it represents
the consumption of the share of the population that does have
access averaged over the whole population (including those
without access). When comparing these two data sources, we ﬁnd
a clear positive relationship.4
As can be seen from Table 1, for countries with an electricity
access rate between 0 and 25 per cent, 21 out of 24 countries have
a per capita household consumption rate of 50 kWh or lower.
Moreover, all nine countries with an electricity access share of 61
per cent or higher report a per capita consumption level higher
than 50 kWh (and ﬁve of these have a consumption rate exceeding
300 kWh). Thus, although there is likely to be unresolved country
heterogeneity, this at least shows that past increases in the per
capita household electricity consumption have not only beneﬁted
the rich minorities.
There are several reasons why we choose to study household
consumption rather than access rates. First, there are well-known
reliability problems with the IEA data on access rates. The deﬁni-
tion of access is not strictly applied; data are compiled from dif-
ferent sources and self-reported by countries (e.g., Doll and Pa-
chauri, 2010; WB and IEA, 2015). It is argued that the sources of
errors in the data often lead to overestimated access rates (Min,
2008). This is possibly the case also with the data on household
electricity consumption, provided by the UN. We do not have
sufﬁcient information about the sources of data to know its ac-
curacy. Still, the documented problems with reliability of data on
access rates motivate us to use another type of indicator, and the
consumption data from the UN is available for more countries and
years than the EIA data series for access rates, which has more
gaps in the data. Second, although electricity access is an im-
portant indicator of the extent to which states have entered the
undertaking of providing electricity infrastructure, it usually says
little about the quality and the reliability of the supply. Awaiting
improved metrics on electricity access (see WB and IEA, 2015), the(footnote continued)
case where these systems are operated by the public utility. Non-governmental
systems are not included.
4 This cross-country comparison builds on data for the year 2004, and where
we have categorized 44 African countries according to two dimensions: (a) three
different groups based on their per capita household electricity consumption levels
(i.e., 0–50 kWh, 51–300 kWh, and 301 kWh or higher); and (b) three groups based
on their household electricity access rate (i.e., 0–25%, 26–60%, and 61–100%). This
categorization results in a matrix consisting of nine groups (Table 1).advantage of our dependent variable, compared to connection
rates, is that it measures how access translates into real use, rather
than just availability of distribution infrastructure. In case there
are signiﬁcant problems of reliability of supply, it should have a
negative effect on the level of consumption. However, the way we
have constructed our dependent variable, it adequately reﬂects
both the reliability of supply and the access rate.
The second alternative measure is a newly introduced one,
showing the share of population in unlit areas based on analyses of
satellite night time images (Doll and Pachauri, 2010; Min, 2008).
This measure shows the number of people in unlit villages, deﬁned
as places that would have detectable lights if electricity were
present. Apart from the methodological problems that impact the
reliability of the estimates, e.g., discussed by Doll and Pachauri
(2010), this method only measures stable outdoor lights, which
can be a problem in African countries where supply is notoriously
unreliable and load shedding is used in many areas (World Bank,
2009). Another drawback is that people without direct access
living in electriﬁed towns and villages are counted as electriﬁed
(or ‘lit’). For example, people living in slums in big cities fall within
the lit areas, but typically have restricted access to other equally
important beneﬁts from electricity.
2.2.2. Independent variables
Our two independent variables are the levels of democracy and
institutional quality and we rely on existing indicators when
measuring them. To capture countries’ democracy level, we use
the imputed Freedom House/Polity score Freedom House (Mar-
shall and Jaggers, 2002; Teorell et al., 2011). This score is a com-
bination of two widely used measures of democracy, the Freedom
House measures for political rights and civil liberties (including
the fairness of the electoral process, the right of opposition parties
to take part, freedom for media and organizations, the right of
assembly, etc.) and Polity IV, which focuses on electoral matters –
such as elements of political competition and the role of popular
participation in recruiting the executive – and the distribution of
power, including constraints on the executive (for a critical dis-
cussion and comparison of the two indicators, see Hadenius and
Teorell, 2005). Hadenius and Teorell (2005) show that a combi-
nation (average) of these two measures performs better in terms
of validity and reliability than its constituent parts. The scale of
this variable ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes ‘least demo-
cratic’ and 10 ‘most democratic’. Where data on Polity is missing,
data has been imputed by regressing Polity on the average Free-
dom House measure (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005).5 The Quality of
Government Institute provides data for this variable (Teorell et al.,
2011).
For institutional quality we use a combination of the World5 Out of the countries used in our analysis, data have been imputed for the
Maldives, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles. We also ran sensitivity tests using
country samples without the imputed data for missing observations. The results
from these show that the overall conclusions of the analysis remain the same: the
effect of the institutional quality index and democracy on per capita household
electricity consumption are still positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
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corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2009). The Worldwide Governance
Indicators are based on several hundred individual variables
measuring perceptions of governance, and reﬂecting the views of a
diverse range of stakeholders. The individual measures are as-
signed to categories capturing six dimensions of governance:
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Vio-
lence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality,
Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.6 The scores range from –
2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.7
The dimensions that best ﬁt with our theoretical notions about
the role of good governance in provision of electricity are Rule of
Law and Control of Corruption. Rule of Law includes several in-
dicators, which measure the extent to which fair and predictable
rules form the basis for economic and social interactions as well as
the extent to which property rights are being protected. This in-
cludes the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the
enforceability of contracts. Control of Corruption measures the
perceptions about corruption, conventionally deﬁned as the ex-
ercise of public power for private gain. The speciﬁc indicators
range from perceptions of the frequency of “additional payments
to get things done”, effects of corruption on the business en-
vironment, and “grand corruption” or “state capture” (Teorell et al.,
2011). Our index of “institutional quality” takes the average of
these two items.8 Observations are available from 1996, with some
gaps in the series during earlier years.
The item Government Effectiveness – which among other in-
dicators includes the competence of civil servants and the in-
dependence of the civil service from political pressures – is the-
oretically also relevant as a measure of institutional quality. The
problem with this dimension of governance, however, is that it
also includes perceptions of the quality of public service provision.
Since such perceptions could well include provision of reliable and
affordable electricity, this dimension conﬂates the independent
and the dependent variable.
We have chosen not to include the dimension Voice and Ac-
countability, which measures various aspects of the political pro-
cess, civil liberties and political rights. The reason for this omission
is that in our theoretical framework these aspects represent de-
mocratic qualities; they should thus be distinct from institutional
quality and be measured separately (and they are included in our
measure of democracy). The dimension Political Stability, which
measures perceptions of the risk for the government being over-
thrown by unconstitutional or violent means (including domestic
violence and terrorism) (Teorell et al., 2011), is treated as a sepa-
rate control variable as it may be an important explanatory factor,
but it does not belong in our theoretical deﬁnition of good
governance.
2.2.3. Control variables
As indicated in Section 1, the statistical analysis includes a
number of control variables. First, previous research has shown6 An unobserved components model has been used to construct six aggregate
governance indicators. The governance estimates are normally distributed with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (1) each year of measurement. Al-
though standardized estimates can be problematic for comparisons within coun-
tries over time, Kaufmann et al. (2006) ﬁnd no systematic time trends in a selection
of indicators, thus suggesting that the time-series information in the World Bank's
scores can be used.
7 The fact that the indicators are exclusively based on subjective (perceptions-
based) data is a source of criticism. Still, in many instances there are no objective
measures available, and/or the objective measures tend to capture de jure gov-
ernance rather than de facto governance (see Kaufmann et al., 2009).
8 In order to test whether the items are sufﬁciently inter-related to justify their
combination in an index we calculated Cronbach's alpha. This test showed an alpha
value of 0.92, thus providing a high credibility to our index.that electriﬁcation is largely dependent on economic resources
(Zomers, 2001). We thus include an estimate of the countries’ GDP
per capita. Data come from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators, and are also provided by the Quality of Government
Institute (Teorell et al., 2011; World Bank, 2013a). Due to its
skewed distribution, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita is
used in many other studies. However, in the African context,
where the economies are very small in a global comparison, it is
not obvious that one should use the natural logarithm and by that
also expect a diminishing “utility” of GDP per capita. Because of
this, we do not employ the logarithm of GDP per capita in the
main model, but we run an additional model including this
variable.
Since it is, all else equal, more difﬁcult to increase access to
reliable and affordable energy when the population is spread over
vast areas, we include a variable measuring population density.
This measure – number of people per square kilometre of land
area – is based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization
and World Bank population estimates included among the World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013b).
When political conﬂicts emerge, this usually means a great
challenge for the goal of electriﬁcation. In countries that have
suffered from armed conﬂicts, the electricity infrastructure has
often been seriously damaged or is out of order due to a lack of
maintenance. Not only do conﬂicts imply a great obstacle to the
normal functioning of the state. It is also common that the parties
included in the conﬂict are trying to cut the electricity supplies of
its enemies by destroying their infrastructure. We therefore in-
clude the World Bank Worldwide Governance indicator “political
stability” (as previously mentioned), which combines several in-
dicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that the gov-
ernment in power will be destabilized or overthrown through
unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic vio-
lence and terrorism (Kaufmann et al., 2009; Teorell et al., 2011).9
Finally, we also control for domestic oil production measured in
metric tons per capita. Previous research has identiﬁed a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and positive impact of oil production on the share
of the population that lives in lit areas at the global level (Min,
2008). This ﬁnding by Min (2008) contrasts with ideas put forward
in the “resource curse” literature, where the argument has been
made that in the absence of good democratic institutions (e.g., rule
of law, lack of corruption, conﬂict management etc.) exploitation
of natural resources could provide meagre opportunities for public
beneﬁts (Auty, 2001; Van der Ploeg, 2011). For our purposes this
suggests that high oil production rates may hinder the develop-
ment of competing energy sources such as electricity, including
not the least investments in the public infrastructure needed to
access new households. In order to address these contradictory
perspectives, and the possibility that oil production could be an
alternative explanation driving our results, we include oil pro-
duction as a control variable. Data over crude petroleum produc-
tion (in metric tons per capita) come from the Energy Statistics
Database (United Nations, 2013).
2.2.4. Description of data
The statistical analyses rely on yearly country-speciﬁc ob-
servations from 44 African countries over the time period 1996–
2009. The selection of countries and time-period is primarily an
outcome of data availability. Our focus on the role of institutional
quality does not permit an analysis of the situation prior to 1996.
In addition, due to some reporting lags and frequent revisions of9 Like the other governance indicators, this variable is normally distributed
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (1) each year of measurement,
with scores normally ranging between –2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores correspond to
better outcomes.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variablesa.
Variables Deﬁnitions Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Household electricity consumption Annual household electricity consumption (kWh/capita) 109.009 165.795 0.830 896.128
Independent variables
Institutional quality Average scores of Rule of law and Control of corruption 0.599 0.565 2.053 0.959
Democracy Average of Freedom House and Polity IV scores (0–10) 4.591 2.508 0.5 10
Political stability Perceptions of risk for political instability/violence 0.461 0.874 2.986 1.188
Population density People per square kilometre of land area 97.810 163.039 1.936 1039.13
Oil production per capita Annual crude petrol production (metric tons per capita) 0.850 3.439 0 31.842
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP adjusted (constant International USD) 3013.263 4301.083 247.889 31,518.5
a Mean estimates, standard deviations, max and min are calculated based on the countries included in the analysis over the period 1990–2009. Observations for the
Institutional Quality Index and Political Stability, however, are missing until the year 1996.
Table 3
Estimated regression coefﬁcients (standard errors in parentheses).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutional quality 42.67*** 23.29***
(10.22) (8.879)
Democracy 3.417*** 8.746*** 3.000** 2.963**
(1.263) (1.674) (1.249) (1.244)
Political stability 10.81** 17.34*** 18.57*** 16.80***
(5.219) (5.323) (6.265) (6.062)
Population density 0.0166 0.0275 0.0330* 0.0313
(0.0217) (0.0212) (0.0188) (0.0195)
Oil production 16.11*** 9.255*** 18.10*** 17.65***
(4.465) (2.336) (4.373) (4.241)
GDP per capita 0.0322*** 0.0337*** 0.0332***
(0.00265) (0.00243) (0.00245)
GDP per capita (log) 136.2***
(10.73)
Rule of law 47.76*** 48.27***
(10.64) (9.173)
Control of corruption 3.498
(9.742)
Constant 31.67*** 922.4*** 36.99*** 37.05***
(10.36) (76.16) (9.859) (10.19)
N 477 477 477 477
R2 0.642 0.648 0.665 0.659
* po0.10.
** po0.05.
*** po0.01.
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2009. The countries included are listed in Appendix A. Table 2
summarizes the variables used in the quantitative analysis, and
displays how each variable is deﬁned as well as some important
descriptive statistics.
2.3. Statistical estimation issues
The use of a “pooled” data set, or Time-Series Cross-Section
data set, compared to a cross-sectional data set has the advantage
of increasing the number of observations (and thus the degrees of
freedom). Another advantage is that pooled data sets permit the
inclusion of country-speciﬁc effects (which can be assumed to be
ﬁxed over time), thus avoiding bias in the estimates due to un-
observed heterogeneity across countries. Still, Baltagi and Grifﬁn
(1984) suggest that if the variation between countries greatly ex-
ceeds the within variation (i.e., the variation over time), then or-
dinary least squares regression (OLS) with common intercepts (i.e.,
no country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects) as well as slope coefﬁcients be-
comes the preferred estimator.
Finally, in reporting our results we primarily focus on the sign
and the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated regression coefﬁ-
cients. An important reason for is that our key independent vari-
ables (e.g., institutional quality) are measured along an ordinal
scale (i.e., data are shown simply in order of magnitude as there is
no standard of measurement of differences). It is well-known that
in such cases the estimated coefﬁcients do not provide any
meaningful information about the magnitudes of the respective
impacts.3. Results
The results from the panel data regression analyses are pre-
sented in Table 3, which displays the results from four different
model speciﬁcations.10 The ﬁrst model is our base model, while
the remaining models represent the outcomes of different types of10 Preliminary analyses revealed that one country – Libya – clearly distorted
the overall relationships. This is especially true for the democracy variable: In the
year 2000, Libya was the least democratic of all the countries in the sample, but
simultaneously had the highest per capita household consumption of electricity.
Libya has built extensive electricity infrastructure around the oil industry and is
now one of the countries with the highest installed capacity on the continent and
with the highest total electricity consumption in Northern Africa. In fact, Libya is an
outlier not only within the full set of countries but also within the group of oil-
producing countries: when Libya is excluded, oil production is negatively correlated
with per capita household consumption of electricity; otherwise this is not the
case. The Libyan case deserves further attention, but for the above reasons this
country has been excluded from our analysis.robustness tests. In what follows, we ﬁrst devote attention to the
base model results and then revert to the remaining model
speciﬁcations.
The results in our base model are well in line with our theo-
retical expectations; we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant positive im-
pacts of both institutional quality and democracy on per capita
household electricity consumption. These results are thus con-
sistent with the notion that where politicians are held accountable
for their decisions and where they are also able to implement
large infrastructure projects, these countries are more likely to
report relatively high levels of per capita household electricity
consumption.
Regarding the control variables, the GDP per capita variable has
the expected positive effect on per capita household electricity
consumption, highlighting, for instance, the importance of funding
for the huge ﬁnancial undertakings that investments in electricity
infrastructure and generation constitute.
Population density does not have a statistically signiﬁcant ef-
fect on the per capita electricity consumption levels in the base
model. This implies that it may not be population density per se,
but rather the distribution of people within a country of a given
11 The poor management of some state-owned electric utilities in part moti-
vated private sector involvement. Many African public utilities have been char-
acterized by poor ﬁnancial and technical performance, as well as by political in-
terference from governments and urban elites (Karekezi and Kimani, 2002).
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other words, future research should also address the potential
impacts of urbanization rates, given that it is easier to reach the
larger cities, but also how settlement patterns in rural areas affect
the conditions for, and in turn are affected by, rural electriﬁcation.
We ﬁnd a negative correlation between oil production per ca-
pita and per capita electricity consumption levels. This result is in
opposition to previous research ﬁndings using satellite images and
reporting a positive effect of oil production on the provision of
electric light (Min, 2008). Our result is however consistent with
the notion that, in general, the oil-producing countries in Africa
have not invested their proﬁts from oil into the provision of
electricity infrastructure for the public domain (Libya being the
exception).
Finally, and clearly in contradiction to our expectations, the
results in the base model suggest a negative effect of political
stability, basically implying that the higher the perceived like-
lihood that the government in power will be destabilized or
overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means,
the higher is the per capita electricity consumption at the house-
hold level. It should however be mentioned that in the bivariate
case, this variable displays the expected positive relationship with
household electricity consumption. Excluding political stability
from the analysis yields somewhat lower coefﬁcients for the
variables of interest, however the conclusions regarding statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and positive effects of democracy and institutional
quality remain (results not shown here). Future studies may want
to consider measuring also actual outbreaks of conﬂict besides
perceptions of the risk for such outbreaks.
Overall the results from our base model suggest that neither of
our two hypotheses regarding the role of democracy and good
governance, respectively, on the provision of household electricity
services can be falsiﬁed. Before this can be properly concluded,
however, we must test how robust these results are with respect
to the use of alternative model speciﬁcations.
In model (2) we included per capita GDP in logarithmic form.
As has been noted above, this is a standard measure motivated by
the argument that a modest absolute impact should be assumed
for this variable for countries with relatively high-income levels.
Table 3 shows that at a general level, our results are robust with
respect to this alternative model speciﬁcation; the coefﬁcients
representing both democracy and the institutional quality index
remain statistically signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcients.
Finally on robustness tests, we also tested two different model
speciﬁcations (models (3) and (4)) in which the different in-
dicators of the institutional quality index were included separately
in the regression equation. Here a general-to-speciﬁc modelling
strategy (e.g., Hendry, 1995) was used, i.e., starting with both in-
dicators and reducing the coefﬁcients by removing the least sta-
tistically signiﬁcant indicator from the model. Overall Table 3
shows that our results are overall robust with respect to these
alternative model speciﬁcations. The Rule of Law indicator is the
only statistically signiﬁcant institutional variable, but given the
high correlation between the different indicators (see also Section
2.2) this result should be expected.
Finally, in order to take into account the sometimes divergent de-
velopment trajectories of Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, respec-
tively, we also ran the analysis while excluding the Northern African
countries (i.e., Egypt, Libya Morocco and Tunisia) from the sample. The
results from this sensitivity test are reported in Appendix B, and dis-
play that the central conclusions hold also in this speciﬁcation.
4. Discussion
The existing literature on household electriﬁcation trends in
low-income countries generally concludes that while theavailability of funding is a necessary condition for increased elec-
tricity access, it is still not sufﬁcient. Our analysis contributes to
previous discussions of political and institutional issues (e.g.,
Onyeji et al., 2012) by framing public electricity provision as a case
of provision of public goods and by testing the relevance of in-
stitutional theories that highlight the importance of democracy
and institutional quality for service delivery in the context of
household electricity consumption in Africa.
Contrary to, for instance, Rothstein (2011), we ﬁnd that both
democracy and good governance matter for public good provision
and not only the latter, even though we control for per capita in-
come (GDP) levels. The fact that both these factors have a positive
effect on per capita household electricity consumption should not
come as a surprise. They capture two important aspects or di-
mensions of policy-making: the input dimension, i.e., the proce-
dures preceding decision-making and the throughput dimension,
the latter referring to the governance structures through which
ofﬁcial decisions are being implemented (Sharpf, 1997). The way
we have conceptualized the causal link between democracy and
public electricity provision, operationalized and ﬁnally measured
it, we should expect that democratic institutions – i.e., competing
opposition parties, free media and public participation in the re-
cruiting of executives – lead politicians to respond to public de-
mand for electricity services in order to be able to demonstrate
results when facing future elections.
The importance of well-performing implementing organizations in
the case of providing electricity can be illustrated with an example
from the time period following decolonization in Africa. In many co-
lonized countries, the national systems for the generation, transmission
and distribution of electric power were built by the colonial powers in
order to supply important industries and cities with fuels and elec-
tricity. At time of independence, many countries were drained of staff
in government and public sector as the European colonial states left. In
some countries, various political conﬂicts damaged the infrastructure,
such as in Mozambique (Hultman, 2009). The drop in organizational
capacity and the associated decrease in institutional quality that fol-
lowed from the sudden loss of human capital, as well as the time lag in
rebuilding those, probably had long-lasting negative impacts on state-
dominated energy sectors. Thus, even if countries are scoring high on
democratic indexes, the present governments most probably fall short
in their ambitions and political promises unless they can be backed-up
by an administrative apparatus that can ensure that the democratically
founded decisions are being implemented properly.
Our results suggest that in pursuing, for instance, foreign aid
policy and energy sector reform goals, an integrated approach
towards household electriﬁcation is needed. Electricity access is
part of broader institutional challenges in Africa requiring both
well-functioning input institutions and throughput institutions,
and these must be addressed and improved jointly.
As we see it, such issues have in part been neglected in the
development of foreign aid as well as in the strategies employed
by, e.g., the World Bank. In the 1980s up until the 1990s, the World
Bank's strategy on rural electriﬁcation shifted from ﬁnancial sector
support towards the promotion of energy sector reforms. These
reforms have primarily targeted formal institutional frameworks,
economic efﬁciency and involvement of the private sector (Kar-
ekezi and Kimani, 2002; Nawaal Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008;
Weisser, 2004; World Bank, 2008).
The emphasis on economic aspects in energy sector reform
efforts has often come at the cost of social aspects (i.e., equity,
public services and ‘electricity for all’) (e.g., Zomers, 2003).11 But
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informal aspects of implementation. For example, previous work
identiﬁes the lack of human capital, top-down organizational
structures, and low salaries for staff that lead them to take jobs on
the side, as well as corruption, as important barriers to effective
implementation (Ahlborg and Hammar, 2014; Haanyika, 2006).
Such informal and human aspects of organizational capacity and
culture have been left largely unaddressed by previous reforms,
which instead have, arguably, been driven by a top-down logic.
Thus, rather than making any claims that the solution to suc-
cessful electriﬁcation in African countries solely lies in the pre-
sence of democratic and institutional reform, we rather argue that
our ﬁndings contribute to the recognition that the provision of
public goods is a complex task—electriﬁcation being no exception
—and that any success is most likely dependent upon multiple
factors, including political regime type and institutional quality.
We are also aware that capturing the full complexity of the issue
clearly requires additional factors, data and research methods.
On a ﬁnal note, although rural electriﬁcation has hitherto been
a responsibility of the state, due to the huge investments needed
for building large-scale grid infrastructure, there is now an in-
creased interest in decentralized development paths. A combina-
tion of factors – e.g., technological innovation, environmental
concerns, change in political priorities and new forms of ﬁnancing
– has led many countries to consider an alternative, or at least a
complementary, policy approach to rural electriﬁcation. Small-
scale decentralized generation and distribution, e.g., making use of
locally available renewable energy sources, offers a range of so-
lutions that can meet household and community energy needs at
lower cost than an expansion of the national grid. If this trend
continues it may well alter the role of government policy in
electricity service provision. Our understanding of the historical
relationships between democratic government, institutional
quality and public goods provision may therefore not be relevant
for future energy systems where actors presumably may take on
new roles, technical systems are conﬁgured differently and cen-
tralized governance is replaced by polycentric forms of governance
(Goldthau, 2014).5. Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper, we have addressed the overall question of what
explains popular access to and use of affordable and reliable
electricity in African households. Founded in theories that high-
light the importance of democracy and institutional quality for
public good provision, we hypothesize that these factors can help
us better understand the variance in average household con-
sumption of electricity across African countries over the time
period 1996–2009. According to our ﬁndings, both qualitative in-
put aspects (i.e., political and legal procedures) and throughput
aspects of the state (regulating the behaviour of the implementing
bureaucracy) contribute to explaining the observed variation in
household electricity use. Speciﬁcally, the results from our statis-
tical analyses cannot falsify our two hypotheses suggesting a po-
sitive relationship between both the presence of democratic in-
stitutions and institutional quality on the one hand and per capita
household electricity consumption on the other.
This illustrates that institutional theories are relevant also in
areas where contemporary debates have tended to centre on
economic development, ﬁnancial prerequisites and ownership is-
sues. An important policy implication is that energy sector reform
efforts in general and efforts to promote household electriﬁcation
(e.g., as part of foreign aid) in particular should increasingly payattention to important institutional constraints and capacity-
building efforts. These efforts are thus not only about bringing in
the necessary economic resources in terms of ﬁnancing.
While our results are overall robust in terms of country sample,
variable speciﬁcations, imputed values etc., the ﬁndings also
generate several important questions for future research efforts.
First, we have only been concerned with explaining the variation
found in data over household electricity consumption. Equally
important to investigate is if our ﬁndings are valid also when it
comes to countries’ total provision of electricity, i.e., also for in-
dustry and public institutions but also studies of the role that
democracy and institutional quality play in enabling electricity
access to various groups in society (e.g., income groups, urban
versus rural populations etc.). Another issue for future research is
to analyse how per capita consumption is distributed across dif-
ferent groups of households within the same country. Second, to
assess whether our ﬁndings are unique for the African continent,
studies of household consumption in low-income countries at
other continents would be required. Third, while we show that
both democracy and institutional quality appear to play signiﬁcant
roles in enabling household electriﬁcation Africa, it is also clear
that these issues deserve further attention in future work.
There are also limitations with respect to the statistical analy-
sis, e.g., in this paper we have implicitly assumed that democracy
and institutional quality are additive and unrelated, thus implying
that a given improvement in the quality of institutions will have
the same effect on household electriﬁcation regardless of the level
of democracy. In practice, the institutional dynamics and linkages
between government, institutions and electriﬁcation are more
complex and it would be useful to study these dynamics from a
socio-technical systems perspective. Qualitative analysis would be
helpful in order to grasp the importance of informal institutions
and the ‘through-put’ dimension of governance. Finally, the role of
states in electrifying the population is not necessarily going to
remain the same in the coming decades. Entirely new forms of
governance may be expected to develop with the necessary global
transition to environmentally sustainable energy systems. Under-
standing such development will require different kinds of analyses
as well as data other than national statistics on large-scale elec-
tricity provision.Acknowledgement
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Table A1
African countries Included in the statistical
analysis.
Angola Madagascar
Benin Malawi
Botswana Maldives
Burkina Faso Mali
Burundi Mauritania
Cameroon Mauritius
Central African Republic Morocco
Chad Mozambique
Comoros Niger
Congo Nigeria
Congo, Democratic Republic Rwanda
Cote d'Ivoire Sao Tome and Principe
Djibouti Senegal
Egypt Seychelles
Equatorial Guinea Sierra Leone
Eritrea South Africa
Ethiopia Swaziland
Gabon Tanzania
Ghana Togo
Guinea Tunisia
Kenya Uganda
Lesotho Zambia
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Regression model estimates when excluding Northern African countries (i.e., Egypt,
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) from the sample. Estimated regression coefﬁcients (stan-
dard errors in parentheses).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutional quality 33.93*** 25.48***
(8.781) (8.350)
Democracy 6.192*** 9.103*** 6.080*** 6.113***
(1.541) (1.806) (1.531) (1.498)
Political stability 9.634* 16.53*** 10.67** 11.23**
(4.972) (5.135) (5.170) (5.276)
Population density 0.00310 0.0236 0.0000500 0.00383
(0.0232) (0.0213) (0.0225) (0.0222)
Oil production 14.33*** 8.508*** 14.53*** 15.29***
(4.427) (2.230) (4.420) (4.385)
GDP per capita 0.0306*** 0.0308*** 0.0313***
(0.00281) (0.00279) (0.00279)
GDP per capita (log) 131.8***
(10.37)
Rule of law 22.39*** 31.19***
(8.348) (7.296)
Control of corruption 13.07
(9.043)
Constant 8.982 892.5*** 10.68 8.596
(12.01) (74.67) (11.58) (11.59)
N 445 445 445 445
R2 0.646 0.645 0.650 0.651
* po0.10.
** po0.05.
*** po0.01.References
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